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Ethnic Media Effects: Political Agenda, Partisanship, and Turnout

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requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science

by

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DEDICATION

To JC

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ABSTRACT

Ethnic Media Effects: Political Agenda, Partisanship, and Turnout

by

Jaedong Choi

The emergence of the high-choice media environment, combined with the huge influx of immigrants from Latin America and Asia, has increased scholarly attention to ethnic media as an influence on American political processes. While there has emerged a number of research on the ethnic media, considerable research primary focus on Spanish-language media and the role of ethnic media as alternative information sources to mainstream English media. Additionally, there has not been a comprehensive study examining the role of Asian-language media, particularly Korean-language media in the U.S. In the dissertation, I argue that ethnic media, particularly, Korean-language media work as one of resocialization agents in the U.S. by transferring significant issues, developing partisanship, and increasing turnout rate. To test my hypotheses, I use several methods and data. Firstly, I collect and analyze text data from Korean daily newspaper headline articles of 2017, produced in the U.S as well as Korean weekly journal articles, published in the E.U. The results of qualitative content analysis show that Korean newspapers are more likely to pay attention to ethnically relevant and local issues—L.A. and California—rather than Korean news. Additionally, the number of English- and Korean-language Twitter messages

and newspaper articles are counted across 19 issues in the year of 2017. With the generated original time series, I conduct Spearman's rank order correlation, and find evidence of intermedia agenda-setting between Korean-language newspapers and Korean tweets. I also perform cross correlation function with the time series, and find that some public issues such as immigration, North Korea, and racism are transferred quickly between the media outlets compared to other issues. Lastly, using secondary survey data (2008 NAAS), I conduct binary and multinomial logistic regression analyses at a point. The results show that all language types—English and Asian—of media use have a positive impact on the 2004 presidential election, while only English media use and both language media use might increase the likelihood of partisanship. The empirical findings are promising and contribute knowledge on ethnic media effects by filling some gaps in the literature of media effects and racial minorities.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

On May 2nd, 2018, Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti and City Council President Herb Wesson announced a plan to build an emergency homeless shelter in the heart of Koreatown, a city-owned parking lot located near Wilshire and Vermont intersection. During the press conference, not only city government officials but some representatives of Korean ethnic organizations presented and supported the initiative by the city government. *The Los Angeles Times* promptly covered the story and Korean-language media including radio stations and newspapers began to cover the issue from the following days. While late in reporting compared to the English media, Korean media have continuously focused on problems of unilateral communication by the city government to deal with the issue, and exclusion of the community in the decision making process. Moreover, Korean media have successfully mobilized ethnic community by providing their listeners and readers with town hall meeting and demonstration information.

As shown in the example, ethnic media do influence (ethnic) public opinion and get deeply involved in community affairs, while often invisible to the whole public because of its narrow audiences. The emergence of the high-choice media environment, combined with the huge influx of immigrants from Latin America and Asia, has increased scholarly attention to ethnic media as an influence on American political processes. While there has emerged a number of research on the ethnic media, considerable research primary focus on Spanish-language media and the role of ethnic media as alternative information sources to mainstream English media. There has not been a comprehensive study examining the role of Asian-language media, particularly Korean-language media in the U.S.

My primary goal of the dissertation is to reveal the role of ethnic media as alternative agent of political socialization for newcomers with limited knowledge and language on the host society. To examine the role of ethnic media multifacetedly, I raise three related research questions in my dissertation. Firstly, what issues are Korean-language media particularly interested in reporting to their readers? Issues of Korea or the United States? Secondly, to what extent do Korean-language media successfully transmit their message to their readers when compared to English media? and Lastly, in a broader context, do Asian-language media help to socialize Asian immigrants by developing partisan attachment to either political parties and increasing voter turnout as a civic duty? By answering these questions, my research might contribute knowledge on ethnic media effects by filling some of the gap in the literature of intermedia agenda-setting and ethnic minorities.

Several methods and data are used in the analyses. To begin with, I collect text data from Korean daily newspaper headline articles of 2017, produced in the U.S. For comparison, text data from Korean weekly journal articles, published in the E.U., are also collected. With the original data, I conduct qualitative content analysis using a software for automated text analysis. Additionally, the number of English- and Korean-language Twitter messages and newspaper articles are counted across 19 issues in the year of 2017. With the generated original time series, I conduct rank order correlation and cross correlation analyses. Lastly, using secondary survey data, I conduct binary and multinomial logistic regression analyses at a point.

Chapter 2 analyzes texts of Korean newspapers in the U.S. and E.U: the *Korea Daily*, the *Korea Times*, and the *Euro Journal*. According to the concept of geo-ethnicity, ethnic media tend to cover locally vital and ethnically relevant issues. The results of text analysis

reveal that Korean newspapers are more likely to pay attention to Korean-relevant U.S. news and local issues—LA and California—rather than Korean news. The most frequently mentioned word is Trump, U.S. president, not Moon or Park, sitting and previous presidents of Korea. On the other hand, while the *Euro Journal* covers issues in England and Germany at the national level, it is limited in covering local community issues. Lack of local news might be attributed to different reasons including smaller market size and business.

Chapter 3 explores evidence of intermedia agenda-setting effects between Korean language newspapers and Twitter messages generated by Koreans and Korean Americans residing in the U.S. While the study of intermedia agenda-setting has been rigorously developed since McCombs and colleagues (1972), scholarly attention paid to ethnic media, particularly Asian-language media, was limited. Specifically, this chapter conducts Spearman's rank order correlation and cross correlation function of 19 public issues in 2017 between the two Korean-language newspapers in the U.S. and Twitter messages generated by immigrants from Korea. I find that Korean newspaper agenda are associated with Korean tweets, while there is no statistically significant correlation between mainstream English media and Korean tweets. Additionally, some public issues including immigration, North Korea, and race might be transferred between the two media formants in a timely manner.

Chapter 4 examines whether Asian-language media would be able to influence immigrants' resocialization, developing partisan affiliation with the two major parties and increasing turnout rate in 2004 presidential elections. With the 2008 National Asian American Survey, I conduct binary and multinomial logistic regression analyses. The results show that all language types of media use have a positive impact on the 2004 presidential election, while only English media use and both language media use might increase the

likelihood of partisanship. These results partly confirm my hypotheses arguing ethnic media as alternative political socialization agent in the host society.

The final chapter summarizes the work and discusses limitations of this study. All in all, the findings tentatively support my arguments. Korean-language media influence their unique audiences' agenda by transmitting important issues in the U.S and local community. Additionally, Asian-language media positively affect turnout of Asian Americans. The function as resocialization agents might help Asian immigrants adapt into the host society.

Chapter 2. Analyses of U.S. and E.U. Korean-Language Newspaper Front Pages

A. Introduction

The emergence of the high-choice media environment, combined with the flow of immigrants from Latin America and Asia, has increased the number of ethnic media channels across the U.S. For example, it is estimated that there are more than 700 hundred Spanish-language media in the U.S. including newspapers, radio stations, and TV stations (Abrajano and Singh 2008, 2). However, due to the large magnitude of Latino group and Spanish-language media outlets, scholarly attention to ethnic media have primarily focused on the role of Spanish-language media as alternative information source to mainstream English media, whereas the study of Asian-language media is relatively limited.

The goal of this chapter is to explore important agendas, set by Korean-language media, before I examine ethnic media effects—agenda transfer, partisanship development, and mobilizing turnout—on the audiences in the following chapters. The previous literature has found that ethnic media are more likely to cover issues in homeland over events in the host land. However, the idea of geo-ethnic storytelling by ethnic media has challenged the conventional wisdom. By analyzing front page headlines of two Korean daily newspapers produced in the U.S. and front page articles of a Korean weekly journal published in E.U., I argue that Korean newspapers published in both places put emphasis on events in the receiving countries over issues of sending country. However, it appears that only Korean newspapers in the U.S. cover locally vital and ethnically relevant issues. By placing geo-

ethnic events on the front page, ethnic media in the U.S. might contribute for their readers to maintain ethnic identity and to adapt into the host country.

B. Early Findings

The studies of ethnic media would be categorized into four domains. Firstly, ethnic media have targeted narrow group of audiences, and thus follow an advocacy style of reporting (Abrajano and Singh 2008; Branton and Dunaway 2008; Viswanath and Arora 2000). By conducting content analysis of immigration issue, Abrajano and Singh (2008) found that Spanish-language television news programs more positively cover the immigration issue than mainstream media. While both language, Spanish and English, media cover the issue of immigration, an important national issue, the tone of coverage was different depending on their distinct audiences. Similarly, Branton and Dunaway (2008) also found the systematic difference between Spanish and English newspaper coverage of immigration issue using text analysis and non-linear regression models. Spanish-language media are more likely to produce immigration supportive articles while English media outlets tend to portray immigration negatively. This is because both language media outlets want to pursue profit by appealing to their different audiences: Spanish-speaking audiences that prefer to read pro-immigration news articles v. broader audiences that might be less interested in the issue of immigration. In a theoretical analysis of the relationship between ethnic community heterogeneity and ethnic media coverage style, Viswanath and Arora (2000) argued that Asian Indian media only cover ethnic community's internal conflicts to the extent not threatening the stability of the ethnic community. That is, ethnic media might

contribute to create a positive image of ethnic community to the external public by portraying the community positively.

Additionally, ethnic media might function as local media, while empirical evidence is mixed (Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach 2011; Lin, Song, and Ball-Rokeach 2010; Lin and Song 2006). One of the most thought-provoking characters of ethnic media is the concept of geo-ethnicity. By reporting "culturally relevant and locally vital information (Lin and Song 2006, 1)," ethnic media might help cultivate a sense of belong to their local community and manage local issues by mobilizing ethnic minorities. For example, Glendale, CA residents appear to have distinct media choices depending on their ethnic groups belonging including White, Armenian, and Latino. Furthermore, Latino residents in four L.A. communities, Pico Union, East, Southeast, and South L.A. have different media choices, even though they share the same ethnicity (Matsaganis et al. 2011). However, empirical findings from other studies showed limited evidence of geo-ethnicity. By analyzing content of Spanish-, Korean-, Chinese-language newspapers, Lin et al. (2010) and Lin and Song (2006) found that ethnic media are more likely to cover issues in homeland than geo-ethnic events in the host country.

Thirdly, ethnic media use estimates to help maintain ethnic identity and work as significant transnational activity vehicles (Yin 2013; Kerevel 2011; Lin et al. 2010; Moon and Park 2007). Transnational ties refer to diverse cross-border political, economic, and social activities that might reflect emotional attachment to the sending and receiving countries (Lin et al. 2010). Thus, exposure to ethnic media might positively affect affinity for ethnic culture. For example, Kerevel (2011) found that Spanish-language media use positively affect Latino group consciousness—measured with working together politically,

viewing discrimination as a problem, and maintaining Latino culture—of Spanish-speaking readers using non-linear regression with a survey on Latinos. Moon and Park (2007) also estimated that Korean media use might be positively related to the maintaining of Korean culture according to social cognitive theory and cultivation theory. Yet the study only found English media effects on U.S. culture acquisition of Korean immigrants, not Korean media effects on ethnic culture development. But the empirical study was methodologically limited in that the survey sample was collected from only one Korean church at L.A. Koreatown and have small observations (n = 191). Outside the U.S, a study found that the online Chinese media use might reconstruct Chinese migrants' identity in New Zealand (Yin 2013). Specifically, by consuming online ethnic media, Chinese migrants appear to identify themselves as "huaren immigrants" meaning members of larger Chinese group as ethnic minority in the host land, situating somewhere between being "a member of China" and "a rightful New Zealander." However, exposure to online homeland, mainland China, media has influenced on the development of authentic Chinese identity. Additionally, ethnic media might help ethnic language acquisition and retention for those who are born and socialized in the U.S. For example, 'Retro-acculturation movement' is in vogue among younger generations of Latinos, born and socialized in the U.S. Younger Latinos spend time and energy to learn and improve Spanish language to solidify their ethnic identity (Wilkinson 2016).

Lastly, ethnic media might help assimilation process by providing information on hosting county (Katz, Matsaganis, and Ball-Rokeach 2012; Shi 2009; Lin and Song 2006). In general, newcomers experience difficulty to adapt themselves into the host society because of limited knowledge on the U.S. system and lack of English ability. Asian

Americans, for instance, appear to have the least English proficiency. 77 percent of them speak a language of home country at home (US Census Bureau 2010). The percentage of Americans who speak Spanish at home have increased from 5.3 percent in 1980 to 12.6 percent in 2010 as well (Portes and Rumbaut 2014). To overcome the language and knowledge barriers, many of ethnic minorities who were born outside the U.S. tend to depend on ethnic media published by their own language in the U.S. as alternative information sources. It is estimated that sixty million of ethnic minorities in the U.S. gain information from ethnic media (Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach 2011).

In line with the literature review so far, it is expected that Korean-language newspapers have unique readers who might be uncomfortable to read English newspapers. Additionally, Korea press covers events occurring in local spaces as well as issues that are ethnically relevant. By doing so, Korean newspapers might shape Korean immigrants' unique identity as ethnic minority in the host land and Korean diaspora. In this chapter, I am particularly interested in examining important agendas—whether they are geo-ethnic issues or not—of Korean newspapers.

C. Data and Analysis

1. Data Collection

To answer the research question, I collected front page articles of Korean newspapers published in the U.S. and E.U. in the year of 2017. In the marketplace of ideas, media compete one another to grab reader's attention particularly under the current 24/7 digital

media environment. To win the battle, print media selectively put top stories of the day or week on front pages, and strive to make headlines attractive and interesting to their readers. For this reason, I decide to collect front page headlines and articles unlike previous research that analyzed the whole content of ethnic media (Lin and colleagues 2010; 2006). Additionally, The year of 2017 was selected to control outsized influence of election campaigns: the U.S. presidential election was held in Nov. 2016 and Korean presidential election was supposed to be held at the end of the year (Dec. 2017) which almost made 2017 an election free year. But a corruption scandal ousted president Park in March and the presidential election was held in May 2017. While it appears that it is almost impossible to control the external environmental conditions, presidential election campaign including candidate registration was relatively short unlike previous presidential elections. Hence, shorter election campaign might lessen the Korean presidential campaign effects.

Firstly, I have chosen to analyze two Korean daily newspapers, the *Korea Daily* and the *Korea Times*, produced in the U.S. for obvious reasons. The two have the highest circulation rate among Korean-language newspapers produced in the U.S. with around 200,000 copies. The two media companies have headquarters in L.A. and operate seven regional branches across the country (Koreatimes Media Kit 2016; JMnet USA 2016). The *L.A. Ktimes* are available from UCSB library, but I was only able to access newspapers from August to December. Thus, 438 front page headlines of *L.A. Ktimes* are collected. Fortunately, the *L.A. Kdaily's* front page articles are able to be accessible through digital media version, thus, I collected the 932 headlines for the whole year of 2017.

Secondly, I have selected a weekly Korean journal, the *Euro Journal* (www.eknews.net), produced in Europe. It was created in Mar. 1995 and is currently

delivered to Korean immigrants in 19 European countries including England and Germany according to their website. It has the highest circulation with 20,000 copies among Korean-language newspapers in the E.U. The website provides readers with online PDF files of the journal, published on every Wednesday, thus I was able to download 46 front pages out of 52 weeks for 2017. The journal only publishes four times per month, thus missing weeks are only two: May 1st week (5/3) and Dec. 4th week (12/27). Each front page has three articles, thus, the total number of articles is 138. But for the *Ejournal*, the unit of analysis is not headline but document, thus the data include much more texts than the one of U.S. Korean newspapers.

2. Analysis

With the collected data, I conducted text analysis to address the research question. Recently, easy-to-obtain digitized political texts, driven by technological advancement, largely draw scholarly attention to the methods of automated text analysis. For example, the Library of Congress has recently digitized massive documents produced by a few framers of the U.S. constitution and some presidents including personal letters and papers (Daley 2018). While automated content methods are not unlimited in that they still require researchers thoughtful analysis because of the complexity of language, diverse ways of automated text analysis such as classification and ideological scaling might facilitate inferences about politics using massive electronic texts (Grimmer and Stewart 2013).

In this research, to address my research question, whether Korean newspapers are geo-ethnic in nature, I examined word frequencies and created word cloud using a software for analyzing qualitative research, NVivo 11. The software produces the word frequencies

after taking a series of preprocessing including discarding word order, stemming, and removing stop words. Additionally, I looked into the context of a word usage with word trees to validate the automated content analysis.

D. Results

1. Agendas of Korean-Language Media in the U.S.

The results of text analysis are interesting. In the two Korean newspaper front page headlines, the most frequently mentioned word is 'Trump' (see Table 2.1). Moon and Park, the incumbent president of Korea and his impeached predecessor are not even on the top 10 list. Although there were big political issues such as presidential impeachment and earlier presidential election in Korea in 2017, Korean-language newspapers seem to put emphasis on agendas relevant to the president of the U.S. Specifically, Korean newspapers covered almost all 'Trump' relevant issues such as inauguration, his personal characters, anti-immigration policies and executive orders, war against the media, repealing Obamacare, tax reforms, visit to Asian countries including China, Japan, and Korea, relations with North Korea.

Table 2.1: Top 10 Words of Kdaily and Ktimes Front page Headlines

Word	Count	Weighted Percentage (%)
트럼프 (Trump)	114	1.35
한인 (Korean-)	66	0.78
LA	41	0.49
북한 (North Korea)	34	0.40

오바마케어 (Obamacare)	34	0.40
가주 (California)	32	0.38
통과 (Pass)	26	0.31
사망 (Die/Death)	25	0.30
폐지 (Cancel)	23	0.27
체포 (Arrest)	21	0.25

The word 'Korean' places second on the list. Korean relevant issues are diverse ranging from portraying positive images to negative images of Korean community to the public outside and internal members. For example, Korean newspapers cover stories of Korean police officers getting promoted to higher position, the number of Koreans newly passed CA bar exam, and appointment of Korean American as dean of an Ivy League medical school. They also covered stories of Korean mother and daughter involved in marijuana crime, murder of a Korean wife by her husband, tax fraud by a Korean cigarette trader, and high suicide rate in the ethnic community. Additionally, the Korean newspaper headlines raise concerns over Korean relevant public issues such as hostile immigration policies and unclear future of current health care policy. While information of political events such as national or state election is generally introduced, it is found that Korean newspapers are more likely to focus on Korean candidate in elections, for instance Robert Ahn in the 34th congressional district race, to mobilize Korean electorates.

The words, 'L.A.' and 'California' are also highly ranked, 3rd and 6th respectively. Korean newspapers cover L.A. to host the 2028 Olympics, homeless issues in L.A. Koreatown, problems of traffic jam and high rent in the city, and conflicts between the

federal and state governments over different issues including sanctuary cities, raids of undocumented immigrants, and Obamacare.

The word 'Obamacare', ranked 5th, is also a big concern of Korean newspapers. Specifically, they cover the possibility of repealing or replacing the current health care and rising health care costs. Korean newspapers cover long range missile launching, nuclear tests, exchange verbal 'fire and fury' between Trump and Kim Jong Un for 'North Korea' topic, which is ranked 4th.

All in all, front headlines of Korean newspapers produced in the U.S. cover ethnically relevant—achievement and disappointment of the ethnic community, health care and immigration policies—and geographically vital news at the national, particularly, state (CA) and local (L.A.) levels.

Figure 2.1: Word Cloud of U.S. Korean Newspaper Front page Headlines



2. Agendas of Korean-Language Media in the E.U.

The *Euro Journal* appears to be more likely to focus on events at national level rather than events of local spaces. The top 10 list includes words such as 'England', 'English', 'Germany', 'European Union' (see Table 2.2). With regard to the word 'England' (1st ranked), 'English' (5th ranked), 'Brexit' (4th ranked), 'Withdrawal' (7th ranked), and 'May' (10th ranked), the journal primarily covers on controversies over the issue of U.K. withdrawal from the E.U., also known as Brexit. Specifically, it covers triggering of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, Brexit's negative impact on U.K. economy, Conservative Party lost in majority in 2017 general election, crisis of Prime Minister May after defeat. Interestingly, 'England' and 'Daily' are correlated one another. Checking the context using word tree, it appears that the *Euro Journal* highly depends on English mainstream media such as *The Guardian*, *The Independent*, and *The Telegraph* when they produce news articles.

Table 2.2: Top 10 Words of the EJournal front Page Articles

Word	Count	Weighted Percentage (%)
영국 (England)	111	0.79
독일 (Germany)	65	0.46
유럽 (Europe)	55	0.39
브렉시트 (Brexit)	43	0.31
영국의 (English)	36	0.26
일간 (Daily)	34	0.24
탈퇴 (Withdrawal)	32	0.23
경제 (Economy)	28	0.20
유럽연합 (E.U.)	27	0.19
메이 (May T.)	26	0.19

'Germany' places second on the list. The journal primarily covers economic issues including German GDP growth, social welfare and poverty, living costs. It also covers sociopolitical issues such as immigration and refugee influx, and the rise of AfD, a far-right political party, in German federal election of 2017. All in all, when compared to Korean newspapers in the U.S., it is difficult for E.U. Korean newspaper to find any evidence of geo-ethnic storytelling. Given the journal is published for the Korean immigrants living in 19 countries in Europe, it would be difficult to cover local issues with limited pages. Additionally, the estimated population of Korean immigrant in Europe (around 600K) is much smaller than the number of Koreans (over two million) in the U.S. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea 2014). The small size of market might lead to financial hardship of the media organization, and it also negatively affects the production of local community news that requires resources (Lin et al 2010).

Figure 2.2: Word Cloud of E.U. Korean Newspaper Front page Articles



E. Conclusion

The findings support that Korean-language newspapers in the U.S. cover issues of geo-ethnicity. The newspapers appear to prioritize ethnically relevant news including any achievement of the ethnic community in the U.S. society, and campaigning of ethnic candidates in federal elections. However, by covering crimes and disappointments perpetrated by internal members, Korean newspapers do not simply follow advocacy style reporting as previous literature argued. For these reasons, Korean-language newspapers might function as both interest groups for the ethnic community and public goods taking social responsibility by presenting objective and neutral information. The findings make contribution to the literature on ethnic media. Additionally, Korean newspapers tend to cover ethnically relevant public issues such as immigration and health care. Given the high rate of uninsured adults and fair amount of undocumented immigrants in the ethnic community, Korean newspapers appeal to their ethnic readers by providing relevant information. Moreover, Korean newspapers highly focus on L.A. and California issues over Korean news. Any Korean political events in 2017 including even presidential impeachment and election do not appear to the top 10 word list.

On the other hand, Korean-language newspaper in the E.U. has limited local news on the front page, while it apparently cover national issues of host land. Lack of local news might be attributed to the small market size and business. The *Korea Times* and the *Korea Daily* are large and professional media companies, while the *Euro Journal* is relatively small and limited in professional personnel.

This study is limited in some ways. Specifically, I did not examine agendas of other types of media outlets such as Korean radio and television. In the L.A. area, there are two or three L.A.-based radio stations and they do have fair amount of listeners. It is true that Korean restaurants and shoppers often turn radios on and make their customers to be exposed. Accordingly, agendas of Korean radio should be incorporated in the following research.

Chapter 3. Intermedia Agenda-Setting Effects between Korean-Language Media and Twitter

A. Introduction

The traditional studies of intermedia agenda-setting have found evidence of unidirectional agenda transfer. That is, elite or prominent media such as *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* influence local or nonmainstream media, not vice versa. By doing so, elite media work as gatekeepers of gatekeepers defining salient issues and delivering those to non-elite media. However, as the emergence of digital media environment, some scholars began to find evidence of bidirectional or two-way agenda transfer between elite and non-elite media outlets (Harder, Sevenans, and Van Aelst 2017; Neuman, Guggenheim, Jang, and Bae 2014), while others argue that older media outlets still enjoy dominant status in their influence over newer media (Rogstad 2016; Conway, Kenski, and Wang 2015). Unfortunately, however, in this debate, scholarly attention paid to the agenda transfer between ethnic media, particularly Asian language media, and other types of media is limited. While there has emerged a number of research studies on ethnic media, most of them only focus on the role of ethnic media as alternative information sources as presented in the previous chapter 2.

The chapter 3 probes the evidence of intermedia agenda-setting effects between Korean language media and Twitter messages generated by Koreans and Korean Americans residing in the U.S. Specifically, I raise following research questions: How much power do Korean-language media exert in transmitting important agenda to Twitter generated by

Korean immigrants, and vice versa? If transmissions occur, for what issues is it more influential than other issues in setting the Twitter agenda? Those questions remain unanswered.

Using originally collected time series data, I argue that Korean-language media agenda is associated with Korean tweets. The analysis proceeds in four sections. The following theory section discusses the related literature about intermedia agenda-setting effects. Hypotheses are presented in this section. The third section describes data collection and the analysis. And the last section shows what I found from the analysis.

B. Early Findings

1. Agenda-Setting Theory

In reviewing the literature on intermedia agenda-setting effects, I begin with the original agenda-setting research. The agenda-setting function of the mass media has been rigorously examined by political communication scholars since the seminal work of McCombs and Shaw (1972). McCombs and colleagues have established the concept of agenda-setting by arguing that news media tell people *what* to think about (first level), *how* to think about the issue (second level), and what and how to *associate* by transmitting salient objects and attributes (third level) (Guo and McCombs 2016; Vu, Guo, and McCombs 2014; McCombs 2004). More specifically, first level agenda-setting, the most widely known theory, assumes that media influence public concerns by transmitting salient agenda, while second level agenda-setting supposes media transfer salient attribute that an issue has. Furthermore,

third level agenda-setting theory argues that media transfer not only distinct agenda or attribute, but networks or bundles of agendas and attributes. However, in the process of theory sophistication, scholars of agenda-setting are often criticized for developing a big-tent theory subsuming neighboring studies (Li 2018; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). For example, second level or attribute agenda-setting theory shares conceptual similarity with framing theory. For this reason, some scholars of agenda-setting argue that the two concepts, attribute and frame, are compatible one another, whereas others, particularly framing scholars, refute that frame is broader theoretical structure to interpret media coverage (Li 2018, 58).

The original agenda-setting theory challenged once-dominant paradigm of limited media effects, which is based on the concept of selective exposure, by proving strong correlation between media agenda and public agenda. Specifically, to measure the media influence correctly, McCombs and Shaw (1972) excluded early firmly committed voters, who are likely to be strong partisans and thus to rely on attitude-consistent information to eliminate cognitive dissonance within their mind. Second, the authors separated undecided voters into three groups—Humphrey, Nixon and Wallace leaner—and each group was exposed to all the news coverage of some selected media and preferred partisan news coverage to their group. McCombs and Shaw (1972) found stronger agreement between the all the news coverage and the important agenda of each group than the agenda association between partisan news coverage and public agenda.

However, the effects might vary depending on individual characteristics and issue type. In a subsequent study, McCombs and Weaver (1973) defined an important concept, need for orientation, the most important contingent conditions of agenda-setting effects

(McCombs 2004, 78). There are two sub-factors of need for orientation, relevance and uncertainty, and they determine degrees of constraints. As shown in Table 3.1, if an individual perceives an issue to be highly relevant but is unaware of it, the effects of agenda-setting would most likely happen. Health care reform, a universal but complex issue, might be an example of that. On the other hand, if the individual feels an issue is irrelevant but is well aware of that, the degree of need for orientation is low. Additionally, issues might be either obtrusive or unobtrusive (McCombs 2004). If an issue is perceived to be unobtrusive, meaning facing the issue indirectly through the mass media, the probability of agenda transfer is high. For example, federal debt deficit is an unobtrusive issue.

Table 3.1: Degrees of Need for Orientation (NFO) Depending on Sub-factors (Jorg 2006, 424)

		Uncertainty	
		Low	High
Relevance	Low	Low NFO	Moderate NFO
	High	Moderate NFO	High NFO

2. Intermedia Agenda-Setting Theory

Going beyond the original agenda-setting effects, a wealth of research has emerged examining intermedia agenda-setting. Intermedia agenda-setting refers to salient object or attribute transmission between different media outlets. It occurs because journalists often observe competitors' work in order to validate their choice of newsworthy issues (Breed

1955). In general, studies before the advent of the digital media environment found that intermedia communication occur in a singular way, from prominent media to other media (McCombs 2014, 128-132). This journalistic norms might contribute to generate homogeneous news content among media outlets.

However, the advancement of information communication technology raises an important research question to the scholars of agenda-setting: Is the direction of intermedia agenda-setting still one-way given the creation of social media outlets that facilitate content production and sharing for the public? Some studies have found limited evidence of interactions between traditional media and newer media (Rogstad 2016; Conway et al. 2015), while others have shown stronger reciprocal association between traditional media and social media (Vargo and Guo 2016; Neuman et al. 2014). For instance, Conway et al. (2015) examined two-way agenda transfer between traditional media (WSJ, NYT, USA today, LAT, and WP) and tweet messages by 2012 presidential primary candidates and political parties. They found that mainstream newspapers exert stronger agenda-setting power than tweets generated by political elites and parties. The findings are confirmed by Rogstad (2016) that examined reciprocal relations between Norwegian elite newspapers and Twitter. The study found that Twitter users are sixty times more likely to mention mainstream media than the other way around. On the other hand, Nueman et al. (2014) found substantial reciprocal relations between mainstream media and social media including Twitter, blogs, and discussion/forum board. Using Granger analyses, they found "reverse pattern" of agenda-setting, from social media to traditional media in issues of social and public order issues. Vargo and Guo (2016) also used Granger causality analyses and found bidirectional relationship between different media outlets including elite newspapers (NYT and WP),

news agencies (AP and UPI), other traditional media, online partisan media such as The Huffington Post, and non-partisan online media, e.g. CNET. Particularly, the findings that NYT and WP lost their leading role in agenda transfer, that online partisan media exert stronger power in agenda transfer than other media outlets were surprising.

Unfortunately, however, less is known about agenda transfer between ethnic media and other types of media. As I reviewed in Chapter 2, studies of ethnic media only primarily focus on the role of ethnic media as vehicles of transnational activity and alternative information sources to mainstream media. In other words, ethnic media not only help their targeted audiences maintain ethnic identity in the host land, but provide them with information necessary to adapt into the receiving countries. Thus, I specify research questions as follows. Firstly, to what extent do Korean-language newspapers exert an agenda-setting influence to Korean tweets? If it is the case, for what issues is it more influential than other issues in setting the Twitter agenda? Lastly, how much do Korean tweets influence the ethnic newspapers?

In grappling with this question, I focus on Korean-language newspapers. The reason for this involves my own language skills and the group's high rates of ethnic media use (33 percent) following Vietnamese (39 percent) and Chinese (34 percent) (Ramakrishnan et al. 2016). Additionally, Koreans actively consume online political information more than other Asian American groups (Wong, Ramakrishnan, Lee, and Junn 2011). If the media consumption behavior for Koreans is different from other Asian groups under the digital media environment across the globe, it might be affected by home country's high capacity of wireless and broadband internet, and political culture of high participation through online as can be seen in the case of candlelight demonstration that led to former president Park's

impeachment and removal from the office in 2017. In terms of group size, Korean American is the fifth largest group in Asian American while the rate of immigration has slightly slowed since 1990s. Furthermore, the proportion of naturalized population of foreign-born is also 5th highest, 59 percent, following Vietnamese (76 percent), Taiwanese (74 percent), Filipino (68 percent) (Shore 2015). It is estimated that almost one hundred Korean media exist including print, television, radio, and online across the U.S. according to Amredia.com. Given the high dependency on ethnic media, relatively large size of ethnic population, and high number of ethnic media outlets, the first hypothesis for my analysis is that

H1: Korean-language media's agenda is more strongly correlated with Korean tweets generated by Korean immigrants than mainstream English-language media.

While a majority of Koreans in the U.S. are documented, considerable unauthorized immigrants still exist in the ethnic community. According to a statistic by the Department of Homeland Security, it is estimated that 250,000 Korean immigrants are undocumented and it occupies 2 percent of the total 12 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. in 2014 (Baker 2017). Additionally, the percentage of unauthorized immigrants who have stayed in the U.S. over ten years has significantly increased from 41 percent in 2005 to 66 percent in 2014 (Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn 2017). And it is believed that long-term undocumented immigrants are rising as well in Korean communities. For those who overstay in the U.S., immigration policy change would be a big concern. Furthermore, following health care issue is significant as well for the undocumented because it is a highly relevant issue and often vary depending on government policies. For example, the state of California has determined to extend health care coverage to undocumented immigrants while they are not eligible for health care under the Affordable Care Act. In general, some issues such as healthcare or hate

crime are more likely to draw audiences' attention because of its high relevance to the members of ethnic community or issue complexity, i.e. high need for orientation. These characters of immigrant community having fair amount of undocumented immigrants and high profile issues to the community lead to my second hypothesis.

H2: Some of Korean-language media agenda such as immigration, racism, health care, and North Korea more quickly transfer to their readers' agenda than other issues.

C. Data and Analysis

1. Data collection

To test the hypotheses 1 and 2, this study counts the number of articles of English- and Korean-language newspapers and English and Korean tweets from January 1st to December 31st of 2017 for 19 issues. The reasons to select the year of 2017 were presented in the previous chapter 2. Put simply, I wanted to minimize election campaign effects which was not quite successful due to the unexpected earlier presidential election in Korea.

I utilize keyword search to count newspaper articles and tweets for 19 public issues. Previous literature's selection of issue varies according to the research purpose and context, but the selection basically begins with the most important problems perceived by the public (Stocking 2015; Neuman et al. 2014). In the chapter, I also follow the tradition and set 6 overarching category as Neuman et al. used: Economics, Foreign affairs, Government,

Public order, Social issues, and Environment. Then, I set 19 specific issues and generate keywords for each issue. For the issue of North Korea, for instance, I develop keywords such as "Kim Jong Un," "nuclear weapons," ICBM, "nuclear test," "North Korea," and "military parade." Korean words—김정은, 핵무기, 대륙간탄도미사일, 핵실험, 북한, 열병식—, equivalent to the mentioned keywords for North Korea issue, are used for Korean-language newspaper articles search except the *Korea Daily*. Because the website of *KDaily* does not allow to use Boolean searching, I only input a representative keyword, 북한 (North Korea) for the issue. And this method applies to other issues as well. The full list of issue categorization and keywords for each issue is available from Appendix A.

With the list of keywords, firstly, I search four traditional English newspapers, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Times*, and *Washington Post* using ProQuest News and Newspapers Databases. The WSJ and NYT are selected due to their top and runner up rank in circulation. The LAT is not only highly ranked (4th) in circulation, but also there are higher chance for its news content to interact with that of the two LA-based Korean newspapers. The WP is ranked 8th, but it is perceived as an important newspaper in national politics (Conway et al. 2015, 367). Then, I count the number of newspaper articles by week. This is because not a few previous studies assume media agenda-setting effects persist around one week (Neuamn et al. 2014; Roberts, Wanta, and Dzwo 2002). Thirdly, I generate an index of *EngNews* combining four newspaper articles and averaging them.

Additionally, I search two Korean newspapers, the *Korea Times* and the *Korea Daily* using their website. With the sets of keywords, I count the number of newspaper articles by week and develop an index *EthNews* in the same manner.

The study uses Twitter to examine the ways of intermedia communication with the ethnic newspapers. While limited in many ways for research purpose, Twitter data have strength for several reasons. On the negative side, it is not apparently the most popular social media today. Twitter is far behind when it comes to the number of users than other social media platforms such as Facebook or Instagram. Furthermore, the 140 character limit of tweet messages do not directly measure public opinion. Lastly, Twitter users do not represent the whole Korean population residing in the U.S.

However, Twitter data also have strength. To begin with, traditional agenda setters including journalists and politicians use Twitter a lot for different purposes (Conway et al. 2015). For politicians, it is cost effective way to promote themselves and bypass traditional gatekeepers, i.e. news media. Journalists also use Twitter to often post draft-like newsworthy facts not to lag behind in competition to grab audiences' attention. Journalists also follow other competitors' and prominent politicians' Twitter accounts to observe them in a timely manner. Secondly, Twitter incorporates huge amount of public conversation of diverse issue topics. While not the most popular social media as mentioned before, it is still one of the largest social media platforms. It is estimated that there are 68 million monthly active users in the U.S. For this reason, Nueman et al. (2014), for instance, identify tweets messages with public concerns. Lastly, self-reported survey response reveal weaknesses in measuring public opinion as well. Respondents often put under social desirability pressure and implicit and explicit cues are sometimes given to participants. For the very reasons, previous

literature also used alternative measures including social media (tweet messages), retweet mentions, Google search trend, blog postings, and Wikipedia page views (Stocking 2015; Neuman et al. 2014, Yang and Count 2010).

I use Crimson Hexagon's ForSight platform to count the number of tweet messages generated in both Korean and English by week. Particularly, the collection of Korean tweets was geographically limited to the U.S. to only measure tweets generated by Koreans or Korean Americans currently living in the U.S. Table 3.2 shows an example of data collection for the issue of unemployment/jobs/recession.

Table 3.2: The Number of Newspaper articles and Tweet messages for unemployment issue

WEEK	EngNews	EthNews	Ktweets	Etweets
1	50	33	73	102985
2	54	40	137	72550
3	62	40	545	89388
4	52	48	109	111119
5	55	39	295	100242
6	47	35	264	57568
7	52	43	137	68449
8	54	38	451	76251
9	55	38	221	68684
10	47	29	171	123477
11	55	39	288	77887
12	53	38	242	73643
13	45	40	148	65154
14	55	41	182	81620
15	43	26	484	53252
16	54	24	289	55920
17	60	39	479	60840
18	58	44	252	92031
19	51	25	536	60060
20	57	30	635	60536
21	51	27	648	57836

22	55	31	342	109450
23	45	35	594	80137
24	51	36	845	87134
25	49	36	599	53674
26	60	48	258	79884
27	50	32	283	112490
28	41	30	502	53584
29	40	33	493	59328
30	40	42	252	65625
31	47	31	125	153111
32	48	28	135	113573
33	42	28	64	75803
34	37	23	98	62354
35	46	33	184	80776
36	47	21	99	67417
37	43	30	88	64468
38	55	27	139	58416
39	53	33	52	78397
40	48	26	65	104677
41	39	21	88	89431
42	49	29	227	90201
43	49	38	185	85496
44	45	35	197	90461
45	42	22	168	100666
46	42	35	99	84144
47	50	26	138	154096
48	46	34	154	181851
49	38	41	242	150566
50	32	39	163	178494
51	32	46	92	147787
52	35	39	142	127181

2. Analysis

This study examines the relationship between ethnic media agenda and Korean

Twitter agenda. Because the data are collected on a weekly basis in 2017, the dataset allows to probe both inter-week correlation and cross correlation function. Firstly, the study conducts Spearman's rank order correlation with weekly observations. The rank order correlation analysis has been used to test agenda-setting theories for a long time (McCombs and Shaw 1972; McCombs 2004).

Furthermore, I conduct cross correlation function (CCF) using R to identify the relationship between two time series data. The CCF helps identify which is leading indicator and which is lagging indicator between different series. Specifically, when the series y_t responds to past lags of the time series x_t , the CCF identifies influencers of y_t by revealing prominent spikes at the past lags of series x_t . By doing so, The CCF helps understand how quickly agenda transfer occurs between the two media outlets for some issues. After checking stationarity—meaning that mean, variance, and the structure of autocorrelation are stable over time in time series data—with Dickey-Fuller Test and KPSS test, I calculate and plot the CCF over the 19 issues.

D. Results

1. Spearman's rho Statistic for Inter-week Agenda-Setting Association


Spearman's rho statistic is used to estimate rank order correlations. Table 3.3 shows examples of ranked ordering of issues for ethnic newspapers and Korean tweets. It is found that 32 pairs of inter-week correlations between ethnic newspapers and Korean tweets are statistically significant ($p < .01$). For example, as shown in Figure 3.1, there is a correlation

($r = .625$) between week 2 ethnic newspaper articles and Korean tweets at week 3. Additionally, week 2 Korean tweets are also associated ($r = .584$) with week 3 ethnic newspaper articles. All coefficients of ranked correlations are available from Appendix B. However, there is no statistically significant association, at the level of .01, of issue rank between English newspapers and Korean tweets.

Table 3.3: Example of the Number of Specific issues and Rank Order

Specific Issues	EthNews Week1	Rank	Ktweets Week2	Rank
Unemployment/jobs/recession	33	3	137	5
Housing	50	1	357	2
Health care	23	6	38	15
Taxes/tax reform	23	6	102	10
Welfare/poverty/inequity	20	9	135	6
Terrorism/national security	24	5	156	4
Global trade/China	22	8	62	13
Immigration	40	2	87	11
North Korea/nuclear weapon	17	10	513	1
Education	33	3	133	7
Natural disaster	7	17	1	18
Crime	16	11	260	3
Drugs	10	13	103	9
gun control/gun rights	9	14	0	19
Race/racism	14	12	131	8
LGBT	8	16	74	12
Gender/sexism	7	17	54	14
Abortion	6	19	8	16
Climate change	9	14	4	17

Figure 3.1: Example of Results of inter-week correlations ($p < .01$)



2. Cross Correlation Function with Two Time series

To examine relationships between different time series, I conduct Cross Correlation Function using R. The CCF estimates the time lag of the series (x_{t+h}) where the correlation with series y_t is strongest and significant. The time lag h has both positive and negative values including zero ($h = 0, \pm 1, \pm 2, \pm n$). Having a negative (or positive) value for h refers to a correlation between the x-series at a time before (or after) t and the y-series at time t . For this reason, when h has a negative value, it is interpreted that x leads y, while h is positive it often means x lags y. However, it does not necessarily mean to support a causal relationship. To justify the direction of causal mechanism, statistical techniques like Granger causality should be followed (Dean and Dunsmuir 2016). In the analyses, I set the maximum lag as ± 8 because previous literature found that agenda-setting effects generally persist four to eight weeks (McCombs 2014).

Before conducting CCF, stationarity test should be preceded to check any possibility of existence of unit root. For the issue of taxes, for example, all 4 time series have unit roots

by the results of Dickey-Fuller Test and KPSS test. To deal with the non-stationarity problem, I take logs and then difference the original time series. Finally, I plot cross correlation of the two differenced time series, Korean tweets (y-series) and ethnic newspapers (x-series), for the issue of taxes as shown in Figure 3.2. It suggests that the correlation is strongest and significant at lag -1 ($h = -1$, $\phi = .322$, $p < .05$). Put differently, ethnic media coverage on taxes might lead Korean tweets one week. It might be understandable because of the issue complexity of taxes. Twitter messages generated by the public might rely on news media's information and interpretation on the issue.

Figure 3.2: Trends in Attention to Taxes and CCF




Table 3.4 presents all the CCF coefficients between the two media outlets. The first row shows the time lags of ethnic media (x-series) from -8 to 8 including zero. The values


highlighted in gray mean statistically significant coefficients at the level of .05. Some issues such as welfare and crime have several significant values, particularly, gun issue has five significant coefficients. The 13 out of 19 issues are found to have statistically significant correlations between the two media. Specifically, Korean newspapers might lead Korean tweets 1 week for taxes, 7 week for crime, and 6 week for gender. On the other hand, For issues of health care, welfare, education, and climate change, Korean newspapers might lag Korean tweets or *Korean tweets lead Korean newspapers* around 4 week, 6 week, 2 week, and 1 week respectively.

Interestingly, 6 issues including Terrorism, Immigration, North Korea, Gun control/rights, race and LGBT have the most dominant correlation at lag 0 (See figure 3.3). In other words, for the six issues issue, ethnic media agenda and Korea tweets almost go hand in hand in the range of same week. However, because the data were measured weekly, it is unknown whether there is time lag at the hour level, and which is leading indicator within the 7 days. In the H2, I have expected that high profile issues to the ethnic community such as race, immigration, health care, and North Korea would be more quickly transfer than other issues between the two media. While it is unsurprising issues of immigration, race, North Korea that are highly relevant to the ethnic community transfer between the two media within a week, issues of terrorism, gun, LGBT are unexpected to be quickly transfer in the context of intermedia communication. Particularly, gun issue is interesting. While the strongest association happens at lag 0, two values are significant at the negative lags and two are significant at the positive lags as well. It seems that both media outlets reciprocally influence for the issue around where the tragedy of Las Vegas mass shooting occurred.

Table 3.4: Cross-Correlation Function between Ethnic newspapers and Korean tweets for 19 Issues (p < .05)

Issues	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Unemployment	-0.05	-0.02	0.152	-0.04	-0.09	0.175	-0.16	0.079	-0.18	0.239	0.073	-0.02	-0.2	0.025	0.235	-0.19	0.013
Housing	-0.01	-0.22	0.025	0.165	0.119	0.116	-0.13	-0.07	-0.1	-0.04	0.194	-0.05	0.073	-0.13	0.027	-0.01	-0.03
Health Care	-0.14	-0.01	0	0	0	0.054	0.112	-0.13	0.257	-0.18	0	0.046	-0.32	0.063	0.033	0.306	-0.2
Taxes	0.08	-0.13	0.002	0.181	0.071	-0.19	-0.19	0.322	-0.13	0.234	-0.21	-0.1	0.012	0.152	-0.15	0.114	-0.05
Welfare	0.13	-0.03	-0.08	-0.02	0.162	-0.07	-0.15	0.093	0.097	-0.05	-0.11	0.079	0.115	-0.26	0.387	-0.34	-0.08
Terrorism	-0.02	0.072	-0.1	-0.01	0.054	0.165	-0.21	-0.15	0.484	-0.24	-0.18	0.158	0.045	-0.13	0.222	-0.02	-0.12
Global Trade	-0.15	0.086	-0.13	0.212	-0.07	-0.09	0.018	-0.02	0.022	0.211	-0.22	0.132	-0.18	0.071	0.027	0.016	0
Immigration	0.016	-0.04	0.07	-0.04	-0.1	0.025	0.095	-0.21	0.334	-0.1	0.287	-0.03	-0.15	-0.02	0.112	-0.02	0.022
North Korea	-0.01	-0.21	0.176	0.042	-0.2	0.073	-0.09	-0.06	0.45	0.042	-0.19	0.13	-0.25	0.006	-0.02	0.103	-0.05
Education	-0.02	-0.11	0.014	-0.02	0.196	-0.19	-0.05	0.091	0.057	0.079	-0.3	0.232	-0.18	0.142	-0.12	0.186	0.036
Natural Disaster	-0.15	0.006	-0.09	0.107	-0.02	-0.18	0.05	-0.11	0.271	0.001	-0.15	-0.04	0.267	-0.14	0.118	-0.02	-0.08
Crime	0.144	-0.36	0.336	-0.01	-0.18	-0.02	0.083	0.05	-0.24	0.293	-0.15	0.191	-0.06	-0.09	-0.05	0.177	-0.1
Drug	-0.06	0.269	-0.14	-0.02	-0.06	0.051	-0.07	0.076	-0.02	0.105	-0.21	0.142	-0.1	-0.11	0.024	0.132	0.069
Gun Control/Rig	0.065	-0.03	-0.08	0.176	-0.26	0.34	-0.32	0	0.538	-0.38	0.073	-0.03	-0.22	0.299	-0.07	-0.06	0.068
Race	0.073	-0.24	0.189	0.05	0.099	-0.18	-0.07	0.021	0.3	-0.13	-0.02	0.011	-0.16	0.243	-0.18	0.171	-0.15
LGBT	-0.14	-0.06	0.013	0.073	-0.04	0.162	-0.16	-0.11	0.288	-0.02	-0.15	0.103	0.025	-0.18	0.073	0.075	-0.13
Gender	0.102	0.037	-0.36	0.179	0.058	0.065	-0.08	0.117	-0.19	-0.02	0.186	-0.05	-0.04	0.009	0.056	-0.06	0.147
Abortion	0.056	-0.1	0.108	-0.04	0.067	-0.12	0.053	-0.11	0.194	-0.18	0.085	0.046	-0.03	-0.05	0.152	-0.21	0.028
Climate Change	0.085	0.058	-0.1	0.075	-0.12	0.12	-0.09	-0.08	0.019	0.309	-0.29	0.12	-0.09	0.06	-0.07	0.033	0.062

Figure 3.3: CCF between Ethnic newspapers and Korean tweets for 6 issues



E. Conclusion

My results tentatively support two hypotheses. Korean-language media have stronger associations with Korean tweets than mainstream English media have. Additionally, some Korean relevant issues such as immigration and North Korea are more likely to quickly transmit than other issues between the ethnic media and Korean tweets. Yet there are still limits this study have. Firstly, I do not look into the role of Korean radio or television. In the L.A. area, there are two or three L.A.-based radio stations and they have significant number of listeners. Apparently, many Korean business owners such as restaurants and shoppers often turn radios or televisions on and make their customers to be exposed to the messages. Thus, the role of other type of Korean media should be incorporated later.

Secondly, research of causal inference between Korean newspapers and tweets should be followed. To find correlations does not reveal any causal mechanism between the two media outlets. Particularly, the cross correlation function might be spurious when the both time series are autocorrelated one another. And the CCF may be influenced by several factors including trends effects. For this reason, to validate causal mechanism between the two media outlets statistical techniques such as Granger causality should be conducted.

Chapter 4. Asian-Language Media Effects on Political Resocialization of Asian Immigrants

A. Introduction

Seminal works in political socialization studies support the impressionable years hypothesis at the individual level using panel data. The impressionable years model refers to what is experienced during the critical years has enduring effects that remain prominent for decades to come. The Bennington College studies (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991), the Terman longitudinal study (Sears and Funk 1999), and multigeneration studies of high school seniors who graduated in 1965 (Jennings 2015) are good examples that support the critical years model. The findings of political socialization literature raise an important empirical question particularly in the era of mass immigration. Could newcomers learn political attitudes and behaviors in the host countries? Or, do they simply bring with them predispositions from their country of origin? That is, whether past experiences form an obstacle for immigrants' resocialization remains an important empirical question should be examined.

Previous literature of political resocialization found some evidence to the question. It is found that factors such as years of residence and the experience of discrimination in the United States have influence on political resocialization process (Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner 1991; Lien 1994). Put differently, the findings imply that newcomers not only bring predispositions to the U.S., but also educate themselves by exposing new experiences, either positive or negative ones. Yet, the extant literature underspecified the role of ethnic media in

political resocialization. Thus, to extend the understanding of the field, my research primarily focuses on the role of ethnic media in immigrants' political resocialization. I argue that Asian-language media play an important role for Asian immigrants in learning American politics and society as consequential information source. In other words, ethnic media consumption may have a positive impact on partisanship development and voter turnout. To support my argument, I will propose a research design whereby the influence of ethnic media on political resocialization can be tested with the 2008 National Asian American Survey (NAAS).

B. Earlier Findings

1. Defining Political Resocialization

In my research project, I understand the process of resocialization in the context of political socialization. Scholars of political socialization found that family, curricular and extracurricular activities in school, and various events play significant roles in creating a sense of community for U.S.-born natural citizens (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; Niemi and Junn 1998; McFarland and Thomas 2006; Erikson and Stoker 2011). That is, political socialization refers to individual learning processes of certain political attitudes and behaviors by different agents. Similarly, by political resocialization, I mean developing political attitudes and behaviors in the host country (U.S.). Particularly, I examine partisanship and political engagement in my research because the both are the key outcomes of political socialization. Partisanship refers to the psychological attachment to one of political parties, and thus well predicts one's voting patterns (Campbell, Converse, Miller,

and Stokes 1960; Kinder and Sanders 1985; Gerber and Green 1998). Regarding political engagement, my attention focuses on voting among different modes of traditional and nontraditional political engagements. Voting has been considered as a civic duty so that less participation, particularly for younger generation, has been a big concern of American society (Macedo et al. 2005; Dalton 2009). Unfortunately, however, conventional theories of political science are limited in its ability to explain Asian immigrants' partisanship development and to find political participation pattern.

First, prominent theories of party identification find the origin of partisan attachment from different sources: Michigan school assumes that a sense of partisanship is generally learned from parents (Campbell et al. 1960; Beck and Jennings 1991; Jennings and Niemi 1991), while Downsian scholars argue retrospective political evaluations on political candidates or public policies affect the development of partisan attachment (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981). However, foreign-born Asian immigrants have less or no opportunity to learn about American politics and society from their parents (Hajnal and Lee 2011). Also, newcomer's political knowledge in general is not enough to evaluate complicated policy issues of American society. For this reason, traditional theories of partisanship formation leaves little knowledge about Asian immigrants' partisanship development.

Additionally, standard socioeconomic model only partially explains Asian American political participation. Scholars of political participation seem to agree with the fact that one's socioeconomic status determines his/her degree of political participation. Put simply, higher income and education attainment predict higher political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). However, it might not be the case for some racial groups. For example,

Asian Americans' so-called 'model minority' status does not seem to positively affect the level of political participation (Wong, Ramakrishnan, Lee, and Junn 2011). In other words, while Asian Americans seem to enjoy relatively higher socioeconomic status than other racial groups, they do not actively participate in the political arena. Lower participation of a racial group generally makes political parties and candidates unlikely mobilize that racial group (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). It may continuously generate a vicious cycle of differential participation and mobilization between racial groups. Interestingly, however, African Americans, despite of their lower income and education level, appear to actively participate in political arena. For African Americans, it is known that a feeling of group consciousness plays an important role in mobilization (Dawson 1994; Chong and Rogers 2005).

2. Factors affecting Political Resocialization

If so, what factors, other than the influence of family and higher socioeconomic status, would be able to facilitate Asian immigrants' resocialization process? Previous research found that factors such as nativity, citizenship status, length of stay in the US, immigrant generation, and English proficiency play an immigrant role in immigrants resocialization (Lien 1994; Wong et al. 2011). The extant research, according to White, Nevitte, Blais, Gidengil, and Fournier (2008), could be categorized into three groups based on different assumptions on the role of predisposition.

Firstly, “exposure” theory assumes that the degree of exposure positively lead to political learning in the host country regardless of the existence of predisposition. In this perspective, length of residence in the host country has a significant impact on partisanship

and presidential election turnout (Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner 1991; Bueker 2005; Wong 2000; Lien 2010). For example, the study by Wong (2000) supported that years of residency positively affect Latino and Asian Americans' identification with a major party. Going further, Cain et al.'s (1991) study specified the direction of partisanship. The longer Latinos live in the United States, the more they tend to be Democrats, whereas some Asian American groups (Korean, Chinese, and Southeast Asians) have stronger Republican identification the longer they stay in the United States because of their concerns about U.S. foreign policy directly related to their home country, e.g., U.S. policy toward North Korea. Additionally, immigrants might be exposed to mobilization by political parties and ethnic organizations as well (Wong 2006), while it is mainly ethnic organizations, not political parties, that strive to mobilize newcomers. However, the effects of length of exposure on immigrant partisanship acquisition can vary depending on different factors. That is, prolonged exposure does not always promote turnout or partisanship. For example, personal experience of discrimination or hate crimes in the immigration process might be able to depress political activities of immigrants (Lien 1994).

Second, the theory of "transferability" argues that past experience from country of origin helps immigrants to be incorporated into their new home. In this strand, age, a proxy of political learning throughout life, appears to be an important predicting variable for the general public's partisanship and turnout (Niemi, Stanley, and Evans 1984; Black, Niemi, and Powell 1987). The findings are partly echoed by White et al.'s (2008) study showing that older immigrants from an advanced society are more likely to have stronger partisanship, regardless of their years of stay in the host country. However, turnout appears to have no

association with age. It does depend on whether the immigrant comes from a nondemocratic society or not (Bueker 2005).

Thirdly, “resistance” theory hypothesizes that political predispositions formed in the homeland are sustained for one’s lifetime. Thus, past experience in the home country would impede new political learning in the host country. However, this does not mean that newcomers always resist political learning in the host land. I think that even the impressionable years model would be able to reconcile with exposure theory. Immigrants of the 1.5 generation, for example, would be open to learn about the host land, even though they have been politically socialized in their home country to some extent, because they experience the immigration process in their critical years. Moreover, predispositions formed during the critical years are not the unmoved mover.

Although the approach by White et al. (2008) is well organized to the question of how predispositions affect political resocialization, it is not flawless. My concern about the above approach is that immigration should not be understood as a punctuated process that divides the life of immigrants before and after the immigration. For instance, exposure theory emphasizes life after migration. Both the transferability and resistance theories underline what occurred before the immigration but have divergent opinions about whether past experience creates an obstacle. However, immigrants do not sever ties with the homeland but rather sustain social relations with relatives and families in the country of origin for different reasons (Lien 2010). Political transnationalism, developed by scholars of race and ethnicity, pays attention to diverse dimensions of border-crossing activities, including political, economical, social, and cultural ties with the homeland (Collet and Lien 2009). Contrary to the common belief that political transnationalism would hinder political

activities in the host land, there is no clear evidence that transnational activities depress immigrants' turnout in the United States (Lien and Wong 2009). In addition, it is found that transnational relations as well as political learning in the home- and host land positively affect political participation of Chinese Americans across the Pacific (Lien 2010). However, I also think that the transnational ties tend to attenuate as the years of residency increase and generation replacement occurs.

3. Why Media Effects?

The literature altogether suggests that immigrants would continuously educate themselves in the new land by diverse experience. Political learning through exposure to the host land could happen in ways other than longer residency in the host country and experience of discrimination. In the chapter, I consider media exposure as a primary explanatory factor for the immigrants' resocialization. There are several reasons why I study media effects on political resocialization. First of all, more than half of Asian immigrants rely on English and ethnic language media as sources for political information—in particular, reading the newspaper (67%), listening to the radio (49.2%), watching TV (85.8%), and using the Internet (53.1%), according to the 2008 NAAS. Because of limited knowledge of the American sociopolitical system and language barriers, it seems that some Asian Americans consume only Asian language media or both ethnic and English language media.

Second, broadly speaking, media (TV) has the power to shape public opinion by setting the agenda or priming the standard that helps evaluate political candidates (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Zaller 1992). More specifically, scholars found that media consumption contributes to the development of political learning, political efficacy, and political

engagement (Moy, McCluskey, McCoy, and Spratt 2004; Moeller, Vreese, Esser, and Kunz 2013; Delli Carpini 2000; Pan and Kosicki 1997). For example, whether local news, online and offline news media, or call-in talk shows on TV and radio, media exposure affects audience attitudes and behaviors. In addition, it is found that selective exposure of media consumption reinforces partisanship (Knobloch-Westerwick 2012; Stroud 2010).

Third, although studies of the role of media in immigrants' incorporation process began early (Park 1922), empirical studies are underrepresented (Chaffee, Nass and Yang 1990; Liu and Gastil 2014). The study by Chaffee et al. (1990) found that U.S. TV and newspaper media positively affect knowledge of U.S. politicians, issues, and political discussion for Korean immigrants residing in the Bay Area. Liu and Gastil's (2014) studies also found that news media use predicts Asian immigrants' political knowledge and participation. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:

H₁: Media exposure has an impact on immigrants' level of partisanship.

H₂: Media exposure has an impact on immigrants' level of turnout.

Finally, ethnic media may work as a resocialization agent for newcomers. As the fragmented media environment emerged, scholars began to focus on the role of ethnic language media (Kerevel 2011; Moran 2006; Masuoka 2006; Jeffres 2000). To begin with, there is a controversy regarding whether ethnic media help develop ethnic identity. Although some argue that ethnic media increase ethnic identification (Jeffres 2000), others have not found evidence that both Spanish and Asian language media affect group consciousness (Masuoka 2006). In addition, studies on the ethnic media issue coverage have a mixed

record. Whereas Moran's (2006) study argued that Spanish language media simply replicate the English media view in Spanish, Kerevel (2011) insisted that ethnic language media are different from English-language media in their portrayal of diverse public issues. Ethnic-language media are more likely to prime ethnically salient issues and frame the issues in ways that resonate with racial minorities. However, previous ethnic media literature has not sufficiently studied the role of ethnic media on immigrants' political attitudes and behavior. In addition, a number of studies focused only on Spanish language media. Therefore, I hypothesize that:

H₃: Asian language media exposure has an impact on immigrants' level of partisanship.

H₄: Asian language media exposure has an impact on immigrants' level of turnout.

C. Data and Measures

1. Data: 2008 NASS

The research used the 2008 National Asian American Survey, which contains 5,159 samples of RDD telephone interviews. The respondents include the six largest ethnicity groups—Chinese, Asian Indian, Vietnamese, Korean, Filipino, Japanese—as well as people from other Asian countries. This is the first attempt to study political attitudes and behaviors of Asian Americans and their personal immigration experiences at the national level since

the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS) conducted in the early 2000s (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004).

2. Dependent Variables: Partisanship and Turnout

To study the role of media on political resocialization, I design two regression models: a multinomial logit model with partisanship and a binary logit model with turnout. In terms of the *PartyID* variable, a nominal category is generated (Republican 1, Democrats 2, Independents and Other party 3, Non-identifier 4). Particularly, I incorporate responses of "Don't Know" and "Do not think in these terms" into the non-identifier category. The proportion of non-identifiers of the total sample is relatively huge, 32 percent, and previous studies also found similar patterns of non-identifiers. For example, Lien et al. (2004) showed significant numbers of non-identifiers using crosstabulation between political partisanship and other variables. They also used non-identifiers as the baseline category for the multinomial logistic regression. Additionally, Hajnal and Lee (2011) argued that a response of "Don't know" on the partisanship identification question is not necessarily the evidence of nonpartisanship. Newcomers might have limited knowledge on the U.S. political system and society that is required to develop partisan attachment either political party. It would take time and effort for immigrants to develop partisanship in the U.S. Along with the literature, I include not only traditional way of partisan attachment (Republican, Democrat, and Independent), but Non-identifier. With regard to voter *Turnout* variable, if an individual voted in the 2004 presidential election, that is coded 1.

3. Independent Variables

The 2008 NAAS used sequential questions to determine respondents' media consumption. If the answer to "Do you use newspaper (radio, TV, and the Internet) for political information?" was yes, a second question—"Is that Asian, English, or both?"—followed. First, I generate 12 dummy variables of media use based on language preference. Then, I construct an index, *AsianMedia*, summing up the four types of Asian media exposure: newspaper, radio, TV, and the Internet. I also create the *EngMedia* and *BothMedia* indexes in the same manner.

As explained in the literature section, length of residence is a significant factor in exposure theory. However, there is no direct measurement for the factor in the survey. Thus, I use the question of year of entry into the United States. The *ArrivYR* ranged from 1924 to 2008. I categorize them into six time periods (6 = 1924 to 1964, 5 = 1965 to 1974, 4 = 1975 to 1984, 3 = 1985 to 1994, 2 = 1995 to 2000, 1 = 2001 to 2008). Put simply, higher values represent a longer presence in the U.S. Meanwhile, not all exposure positively leads to immigrants' resocialization. Therefore, I include *Hatecrime* experience in the model (yes = 1). Finally, to see the exposure to the institution, I generate the *Mobilization* variable by the consolidating political party and other (ethnic) organization mobilization (yes = 1).

I also control for immigrants' socioeconomic status, *Education* and *Income*. The level of education is coded from 1 (primary school) to 6 (graduate school). House income is categorized into eight groups as conducted by the survey: 1 = up to \$20,000; 2 = \$20,000 to \$35,000; 3 = \$35,000 to \$50,000; 4 = \$50,000 to 75,000; 5 = \$75,000 to \$100,000; 6 = \$100,000 to \$125,000; 7 = \$125,000 to \$150,000, and 8 = \$150,000 and over. All in all, higher values correspond to higher education and income attainment.

Different political orientations are considered as possible confounding factors. Immigrant's level of ideology, either *Liberal* and *Conservative*, is included. The survey did not use the Likert scale for measuring ideology and provided respondents with only "strong" and "not so strong" answer options. Thus, strong liberal, (or conservative) is coded 1 and not so strong liberal (or conservative) is coded 0. Political *Interest* is coded from 1 (not at all interested) to 4 (very interested). I also construct *InEfficacy* and *Exefficacy* variables. The survey asked respondents if they *can't* understand political matters (for measuring internal efficacy), and if politicians care that people like them (for measuring external efficacy). Both questions' answer organization is the same, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). To make the interpretation easy, I reversely code answers for internal efficacy. Thus, higher values indicate greater level of efficacy. Finally, *Trust* is coded from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), which means that higher values represent greater degree of trust.

In the model, demographic factors—that is, *Citizenship* and ethnicity—are included. Citizenship is coded 1. For ethnicity variable, I decide to use *Vietnamese*, *Korean*, and *Chinese* as dummy variables. The degree of English proficiency is an important reason to utilize only some ethnic groups as dummy (Wong et al. 2011). While less than half of Vietnamese and Korean responded that their English is pretty good, 95 percent of Indians and Japanese and almost 90% of Filipino Americans claimed to speak English very well. Chinese slightly lean towards the former group with 66 percent of English proficiency. In addition, the history of immigration for Japanese Americans is relatively longer than other ethnic groups. Most of them are already third or fourth generations and have been assimilated into the U.S. society.

The last confounding variable is a sense of pan-ethnicity. Pan-ethnic identity or group consciousness might help mobilize racial minorities. For example, the concept of linked fate, coined by Dawson (1994), is a well-developed idea to explain black mobilization. To trace the development of pan-ethnic identity, the survey asked if what happens to the same ethnic group members affects what happens in the respondent's life. I reversely code *PanID* from 1 (not very much) to 3 (a lot). Additionally, the survey asked if Asians share same political interest. For *commonality*, a "yes" answer is coded 1.

D. Results

1. Binary Logistic Regression for Testing H₂ and H₄

Before presenting and discussing the estimates from the logit model, I briefly report turnout distribution by different independent variables. All results are available from Appendix C. Because only citizens can vote in elections I include only citizen data (n = 3,898). However, some independent variables lose considerable observations including *Conservative* (n = 647), *Liberal* (n = 839), *PanID* (n = 1,946), and *Income* (n = 2,568). If these variable are included in the multivariate model, it would significantly lose cases. For this reason, I drop them in the analysis.

Table 4.1: Number of Observations by IVs (n = 3,898)

AsianMedia n = 3898	EngMedia n = 3898	BothMedia n = 3898	ArrvYR n = 3201	HateCrime n = 3852	Mobilization n = 3898	Education n = 3777
Income	Conservative	Liberal	Interest	Trust	InEfficacy	ExEfficacy

n = 2568	n = 647	n = 839	n = 3836	n = 3566	n = 3643	n = 3512
Korean	Chinese	Vietnamese	PanID	Commonality		
n = 3898	n = 3898	n = 3898	n = 1946	n = 3123		

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Turnout}_i = & b_0 + b_1\text{AsianMedia}_i + b_2\text{EngMedia}_i + b_3\text{BothMedia}_i + b_4\text{ArrvYR}_i + \\
& b_5\text{HateCrime}_i + b_6\text{Mobilization}_i + b_7\text{Education}_i + b_8\text{Income}_i + b_9\text{InEfficacy}_i + \\
& b_{10}\text{ExEfficacy}_i + b_{11}\text{Interest}_i + b_{12}\text{Trust}_i + b_{13}\text{Vietnamese}_i + b_{14}\text{Korean}_i + b_{15}\text{Chinese}_i + \\
& b_{16}\text{Commonality}_i + e_i
\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

I estimate the model (1) with binary logistic regression. While the model originally had 3,898 cases, only citizen data, after individual cases with missing data are deleted, i.e. Listwise deletion, the number of observations remain 2,167 in the model. Binary logistic regression results are reported in Table 4.2. Because the DV, turnout, is dichotomous, estimating all the parameters is based on maximum likelihood estimates.

Table 4.2: Results for H₂ and H₄


	Coef	S.E.	Z value	P value	Odds Ratio
(Intercept)	-3.585***	0.39	-9.2	0	0.028
AsianMedia	0.176***	0.068	2.588	0.01	1.193
EngMedia	0.161***	0.058	2.765	0.006	1.175
BothMedia	0.212***	0.06	3.552	0	1.236
ArrvYR	0.782***	0.055	14.195	0	2.187
HateCrime	-0.241	0.16	-1.504	0.133	0.786
Mobilization	0.621***	0.078	7.936	0	1.861
Education	0.041	0.047	0.873	0.383	1.042
Interest	0.178***	0.056	3.175	0.001	1.195

InEfficacy	0.019	0.039	0.477	0.633	1.019
ExEfficacy	0.012	0.04	0.287	0.774	1.012
Trust	0.04	0.04	1.006	0.314	1.041
Vietnamese	0.582***	0.18	3.235	0.001	1.79
Korean	-0.651***	0.184	-3.539	0	0.521
Chinese	-0.094	0.143	-0.658	0.511	0.91
Commonality	0.043	0.103	0.415	0.678	1.044
Observations	2167				
Log Likelihood	437.5				
McFadden's R-Squared	0.158				

Note: *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

For the turnout in the 2004 presidential election, all types of media use are positively significant at the level of .01. That is, higher media use for political information acquisition might predicts higher turnout. Additionally, earlier entry into the United States and mobilization increase the likelihood of turnout ($\beta_{ArrvYR} = .782, p < .01$; $\beta_{Mobilization} = .621, p < .01$). The level of education is not found to be significant. This finding is consistent with previous literature found that socioeconomic status which is important for predicting turnout of American public does not work for Asian American turnout rate (Lien et al. 2004). Interest in politics is the only significant factor among a set of political attitudes ($\beta_{Interest} = .178, p < .01$). For the ethnic backgrounds, being Vietnamese and Korean are found to be significant factors on turnout, while the direction is opposite. Being Vietnamese predicts higher turnout ($\beta_{Vietnamese} = .582, p < .01$) whereas being Korean might decrease turnout ($\beta_{Korean} = -.651, p < .01$). Lastly, sharing pan-ethnic identity is not statistically significant.

Figure 4.1: Plotting Odds Ratios for Each Predictor






Because the logistic regression estimates explain the relationships between IV and DV on a log-odds scale, it is necessary to calculate odds ratios for precise interpretations. The results suggest that for every one unit increase in Asian media, English media, and Both media use, the likelihood of turnout increases by 19 percent (OR = 1.193, $p < .01$), 17 percent (OR = 1.175, $p < .01$), and 24 percent (OR = 1.236, $p < .01$) respectively. Additionally, earlier entry into the U.S., mobilization, and political interest increase the likelihood of turnout by 119% (OR = 2.187, $p < .01$), 86 percent (OR = 1.861, $p < .01$), and 20 percent (OR = 1.195, $p < .01$). Being Vietnamese positively affect the likelihood of

turnout by 79 percent (OR = 1.79, $p < .01$), while being Korean negatively influence the likelihood of turnout by 52 percent (OR = 0.521, $p < .01$).

To check the effects of media variables on turnout with a better way, I plot predicted marginal probabilities, as can be seen in Figure 4.2, where covariates are set to the mean. Taken together, the results in Table 4.2 support H_2 and H_4 .

Figure 4.2: Predicted Marginal Probabilities for Turnout





I check a goodness of fit of the model (1): log likelihood ratio test and pseudo R^2 calculation. For the log likelihood test, I use Lmtest package in R, but it also can be calculated manually as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{LR } \chi^2 &= -2\text{LL}_{\text{default model}} + 2\text{LL}_{\text{research model}} \\ &= 2766.4 - 2328.9 = 437.5 \end{aligned}$$

The observed difference between the default model and research model is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 437.5$, $df = 15$, $p < .001$). That is, my research model has explanatory power.

In a logistic regression model, R^2 —the proportion of variance in the DV that is explained by the IVs—cannot be calculated. Instead, there are several way to calculate pseudo R^2 . Using Rcompanion package in R, I calculated McFadden's pseudo R^2 (0.158), Cox and Snell's pseudo R^2 (0.182), and Negelkerke's pseudo R^2 (0.253).

Lastly but not least, I test multicollinearity problem in the model. According to the independence assumption in regression analysis, explanatory variables should not be correlated one another because high collinearity generates unstable parameter estimates. Variance Inflation Factor values and Tolerance ($\text{Tolerance} = 1/\text{VIF}$) are often used for identifying the problem, and I use VIF function in R. In general, VIF of 1 means no correlation and over VIF5 considers as high correlation (Ringle et al. 2015). Some scholars accept VIF 10 as the maximum level (Hair et al. 1995). In the model (1), it is found that the three media IVs' VIF (1.92, 2.37, 1.84) are relatively higher than other predictors. Yet, there is no serious multicollinearity problem in the model.

Table 4.3: Multicollinearity Check (VIF) for Model (1)

AsianMedia	EngMedia	BothMedia	ArrvYR	HateCrime	Mobilization
1.92	2.37	1.84	1.07	1.04	1.07
Education	Interest	InEfficacy	ExEfficacy	Trust	Vietnamese
1.37	1.15	1.08	1.09	1.11	1.25
Korean	Chinese	Commonality			
1.19	1.33	1.04			



2. Multinomial Logistic Regression for Testing H_1 and H_3

I begin with reporting of partisanship distribution by different independent variables. As explained before, I incorporate nonidentifiers as one of the partisanship categories. Given their significant numbers ($n = 1,673$, 32 percent of total cases) and theoretical explanations for large nonidentifiers in Asian American group (Lien et al. 2004; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Wong et al. 2011), it would be reasonable to include them. All frequency distribution tables are available from Appendix D. The results show some independent variables lose considerable observations including *Conservative* ($n = 786$), *Liberal* ($n = 1,091$), and *PanID* ($n = 2,534$). To save more cases in the regression model, I decide to drop them in the analysis. Thus, the number of observation is 2,007 from 5,159.


To figure out any interesting patters of characters of nonidentifiers, I present the percentage change of nonidentifiers for each level of three independent variables¹. As shown in Figure 4.3, as the use of English media increases the percentage of nonidentifiers decreases. Additionally, the proportion of nonidentifiers decreases as the residency in the U.S. increases. Higher mobilization decreases the percentage of nonidentifiers. All in all,

exposure to the host society through diverse ways might decrease nonidentification of partisanship for Asian immigrants.

Figure 4.3: Plotting Proportion of Nonidentifiers by 3 IVs



¹ For EngMedia, I calculate the percentage of nonidentifier for each level of EngMedia from 1 to 5 and plot them.



$$\begin{aligned}
 PartyID_i = & b_0 + b_1AsianMedia_i + b_2EngMedia_i + b_3BothMedia_i + b_4ArrvYR_i + \\
 & b_5HateCrime_i + b_6Mobilization_i + b_7Education_i + b_8Income_i + b_9InEfficacy_i + \\
 & b_{10}ExEfficacy_i + b_{11}Interest_i + b_{12}Trust_i + b_{13}Citizenship_i + b_{14}Vietnamese_i + b_{15}Korean_i \\
 & + b_{16}Chinese_i + b_{17}Commonality_i + e_i
 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

I fit the model (2) with multinomial logistic regression. Because the DV, partisanship, has two more categories, multinomial logistic regression also uses MLE to estimate all the parameters in the model. Multinomial logistic regression is an extended version of binary logistic regression.

I identify multicollinearity problem in the model (2). To begin with, I calculate the VIF values for all IVs, and then exclude the explanatory variable with the highest VIF, and repeat the process until all VIF values are below the threshold 10, i.e. stepwise VIF selection.

Totally, seven variables are removed: Education, ArrvYR, Interest, Trust, ExEfficacy, Income, and Citizenship. With remaining covariates, I generate the model (2.1) and check the multicollinearity with VIF values with threshold 10.

$$PartyID_i = b_0 + b_1AsianMedia_i + b_2EngMedia_i + b_3BothMedia_i + b_4HateCrime_i + b_5Mobilization_i + b_6Conservative_i + b_7InEfficacy_i + b_8Korean_i + b_9Chinese_i + b_{10}Commonality_i + e_i \quad (2.1)$$

Table 4.4: Multicollinearity Check (VIF) for Model (2.1)

AsianMedia	EngMedia	BothMedia	HateCrime	Mobilization
3.16	6.42	4.66	1.56	3.04
InEfficacy	Korean	Chinese	Vietnamese	Commonality
6.72	2.16	1.69	3.71	3.34

The multinomial logistic regression results are reported in Table 4.5. For easier interpretation, exponentiated value of the logit coefficients are calculated, i.e. relative risk ratios. The baseline category in the model is Nonidentifier (n = 693).

Table 4.5: Relative Risk Ratios for Model (2.1)

	Dependent Variable:		
	Republican	Independent	Democrat
AsianMedia	1.067 (0.094)	1.079 (0.081)	1.006 (0.074)
EngMedia	1.353*** (0.083)	1.357*** (0.073)	1.330*** (0.066)
BothMedia	1.248***	1.231***	1.089

	(0.085)	(0.075)	(0.071)
HateCrime	0.644*	1.257	0.98
	(0.266)	(0.201)	(0.197)
Mobilization	1.622***	1.472***	1.335***
	(0.109)	(0.1)	(0.095)
InEfficacy	1.113*	1.016	1.04
	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.047)
Vietnamese	7.441***	3.673***	1.182
	(0.28)	(0.276)	(0.3)
Korean	2.013***	0.487***	1.115
	(0.224)	(0.27)	(0.2)
Chinese	0.657*	1.552**	1.038
	(0.241)	(0.174)	(0.168)
Commonality	1.346**	1.007	1.443***
	(0.151)	(0.133)	(0.124)
Constant	0.167***	0.402***	0.632**
	(0.26)	(0.222)	(0.202)
Observations	2007		
Log Likelihood	277.88		
McFadden's R-Squared	0.051		
Note:	*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01

For partisanship development, it is found that EngMedia and BothMedia variables are statistically significant at the level of .01. Specifically, controlling covariates constant, if English media use increases one unit, an Asian immigrant is 35 percent more likely to attach to Republican (RR = 1.353, $p < .01$), 36 percent more likely to attach to Independent (RR = 1.357, $p < .01$), and 33 percent more likely to attach to Democrats (RR = 1.330, $p < .01$) as compared to Nonidentifier. That is, English media use might be helpful for Asian immigrants to develop partisanship in the American political context. Similarly, as both Asian and English language media use increase one unit, an Asian immigrant is 25 percent more likely to support Republican (RR = 1.248, $p < .01$) and 23 percent more likely to

support Independent (RR = 1.231, $p < .01$) as compared to Nonidentifier. It is interesting that both media use does not significantly influence support for Democrat.

Any experience of hate crime decreases the likelihood of being a Republican by 64 percent as compared to being a Nonidentifier (RR = 0.644, $p < .1$). Mobilization seems to positively influence being partisan in the U.S. ($p < .01$): 62 percent higher for GOP (RR = 1.622), 47 percent higher for Moderate (RR = 1.472) , and 34 percent higher for Democrat (RR = 1.335) as compared to being nonpartisan. If an Asian immigrants feels, he or she can understand American political matters, it might increase being Republican by 11 percent (RR = 1.113, $p < .1$). Being Vietnamese and Korean predict being Republican (RR = 7.741, $p < .01$, RR = 2.013, $p < .01$) as compared to being Nonidentifier, while being Chinese might decrease being GOP by 66 percent as compared to the baseline category (RR = 0.657, $p < .1$). A sense of commonality with other Asians might develop attachment to Republican by 35 percent (RR = 1.346, $p < .05$) and Democrat by 44 percent (RR = 1.443, $p < .01$) as compared to Nonidentifier.

To check a goodness of fit, I conduct log likelihood ratio test and calculate pseudo R^2 . The observed difference between the baseline model and research model is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 277.88$, $df = 30$, $p < .001$). Additionally, McFadden's pseudo R^2 is calculated as 0.051.

E. Conclusion

While mixed, the results tentatively support positive effects of Asian-language media on political resocialization. On the one hand, media use, regardless of language type, might positively influence voter turnout at least for 2004 presidential election. On the other hand, for partisanship development, English media and Both language media use are estimated to increase partisan attachment to one of political parties in the U.S. Taken together, the findings suggest that 'declining democracy thesis' driven by media malaise might not be true at least for ethnic media.

The findings from the two logistic regression analyses are promising. If the ethnic media use helps develop partisan attachment to either major parties and increase voter turnout in elections, the role of ethnic media in American political process, undervalued so far, should be revisited. While it is expected that media function as watch dogs or fourth state, the role of Asian-language media might not fit it with the normative theories of media. By educating and mobilizing its audience, Asian-language media might work as interest group, not only as media.

Lastly, the study has some limitations. It is limited in revealing causal mechanism by relying on cross-sectional data. Additionally, the low pseudo R^2 of the multinomial regression shows limited explanatory power of the model. Because of too many missing data of *Conservative* and *Liberal* variables, which might be highly correlated with partisanship, and by dropping the two from the model to save observations, the model might suffer from low explanatory power.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

In the beginning of the dissertation, I raised three related research questions: What issues do Korean-language media in the United States cover? Do the agendas set by the ethnic newspapers transfer to readers, Korean immigrants? Do Asian-language media work as resocialization agent in the U.S. by helping develop partisanship and turnout rate? To answer to those questions, I used several methods the analyses including automated text analysis, rank order correlation, cross correlation, binary logistic regression, and multinomial logistic regression using textual data, originally generated time series, and secondary cross-sectional data.

In April, 2018, the *Korea Daily* reminded their readers 1992 Los Angeles riots, also known as 4.29 to the ethnic community, through a series of cover stories titled *A nation that forgets its past has no future*. More than simply providing necessary information to adapt into the U.S. society, ethnic media might help maintain ethnic identity not reporting home country's news but covering ethnically and locally relevant issues. Findings of chapter 2 are in line with the concept of geo-ethnicity. Additionally, Korean newspapers sometimes put forward interests of Korean Americans over Korean government. For example, Korean newspapers continuously raise concerns and problems of dual citizenship issue.² However, the study of chapter 2 is limited by excluding agendas of other media outlets such as Korean radio and television. In the L.A. area, there are two or three L.A.-based radio stations and they do have some degree of listeners. Apparently, Korean small businesses owners often

² Under current Korean military law, Korean American men have to implement mandatory military service because they automatically gain Korean citizenship given their parents' Korean nationality. To avoid that, they have to abandon their Korea nationality by the age of 18. If failed, they have to implement the duty.

turn radios on and make their customers to be exposed. Thus, agendas of Korean radio should be incorporated in following research.

By covering Korean relevant American local issues, it is found that Korean newspaper transfer their agenda to Korean Twitter users' agenda. Findings of chapter 3 supports it. Korean-language media have stronger correlations with Korean tweets than mainstream English media have. Additionally, some Korean relevant issues including immigration and North Korea are found to be transferred in a timely manner, within 7 days. Yet there are still limits in the study. Other types of media outlets including Korean radio or television should be incorporated for rigorous study. Secondly, research for causal inference between Korean newspapers and tweets should be followed. To find correlations does not reveal any causal mechanism between the two media outlets. Particularly, the cross correlation function might be spurious when the both time series are autocorrelated one another. And the CCF may be influenced by several factors including trends effects. For this reason, to validate causal mechanism between the two media outlets statistical techniques such as Granger causality should be conducted.

Findings of chapter 4 are promising. If ethnic media use helps develop partisan attachment to either major parties and increase voter turnout in elections, the role of ethnic media in American political process, undervalued so far, should be revisited. While mixed, the result tentatively support positive effects of Asian-language media on turnout. However, low pseudo R^2 of the multinomial regression shows limited explanatory power of the model. Additionally, the study is limited in telling causality by relying on cross-sectional data.

While above mentioned limitations, the research is the first attempt to comprehensively study the role of Korean-language media as an important political

resocialization agent in the U.S. by examining their agenda, issue transferring to other media outlet, and development of partisanship and turnout. In the future, the research of Korean- or Asian-language media be able to be expanded by incorporating other types of media outlets, diverse political attitudes, and behaviors other than partisanship and voting. It would widen the understanding of the role of ethnic media in the United States.

Appendix A: Keyword List

Issue Area	Specific Issue	Keywords
Economics	Unemployment/jobs/transition	unemployment, employment, "jobs NOT Steve jobs", underemployment, "job growth", "job creator", recession, 실업, 일자리, 침체, 고용 (Kdaily)
	Housing	rent, "community development", "urban development", "rural housing", "rural development"
	Health care costs	Trumpcare, "healthcare reform", obamacare, "socialized medicine", "individual mandate", "employer mandate", 트럼프케어, 오바마케어, 건강보험 (Kdaily)
	Taxes/tax reform	taxes, "tax cut", "tax reform", 세제개혁, 감세, 세금 (Kdaily)
Foreign affairs	Welfare/poverty/inequality	"welfare OR elitement", "food stamps", "inequality OR poverty", "minimum wage", 불평등, 빈곤, 최저임금, 푸드스탬프, 복지 (Kdaily)
	Terrorism/national security	terrorism, terrorist, ISIS, "Islamic State", Qaeda, 테러범, 이슬람국가, 테러 (Kdaily)
	Global trade/China	"trade agreement", exports, "tariff OR imports", "exchange rate", "trade war", "trade dispute", 수입, 관세, 수출, 무역협정, 무역전쟁, 무역분쟁, 무역 (Kdaily)
	Immigration	"illegal alien", "undocumented workers", DACA, "border OR wall", 불법이민, 불체자, 다카, 국경, 장벽, 이민 (Kdaily)
Government	North Korea/nuclear weapon	"Kim Jong Un", "nuclear weapons", ICBM, "nuclear tests", "North Korea", "military parade", 핵무기, 김정은, 핵실험, 대륙간탄도미사일, 열병식, 북한 (Kdaily)
	Education	"education reform", "charter school", "test scores", "race to the top", "no child left behind", 교육개혁, 차티스쿨, 시험결과, 시험점수, 경쟁, 교육 (Kdaily)
	Natural disaster	FEMA, "natural disaster", hurricane, earthquake, wildfire, 페마, 허리케인 어마 허리케인 하비, 지진, 가주 산불, 자연재해 (Kdaily)
Public order	Crime	crime, criminal, 범죄자, 범죄 (Kdaily)
	Drugs	drugs, "marijuana OR legalization", "drug abuse", "drug addiction", 마약중독, 마리화나, 마약 (Kdaily)
Social issues	Gun control/rights	"gun control", "assault weapon ban", "background check", NRA, "national rifle association", "second amendment", "2nd amendment", 공격용무기 금지, 백그라운드 체크, 총기협회, 수정헌법2조, 총기규제 (Kdaily)
	Race/racism	racial, racism, racist, "racial discrimination", "hate crime", 인종주의, 인종범죄, 증오범죄, 인종차별 (Kdaily)
	LGBT	"gay marriage", "same sex marriage", "civil union", "traditional marriage", 동성결혼, 동성애 (Kdaily)
Environment	Gender/sexism	"gender discrimination", "gender equality", sexism, "women's rights", 양성평등, 여성권리, 성차별 (Kdaily)
	Abortion	abortion, Roe, personhood, "Planned Parenthood", 플랜드 패린트후드, 낙태 (Kdaily)
Environment	Climate change	"climate change", "global warming", "cap and Trade", "carbon tax", "Paris agreement", 지구온난화, 탄소세, 파리협정, 기후변화 (Kdaily)

**Appendix B: Spearmans' rho between ethnic newspapers and Korean tweets
($p < .01$)**

EthNews week 1	Ktweets week 2	.598
EthNews week 2	Ktweets week 3	.625
EthNews week 4	Ktweets week 5	.641
EthNews week 5	Ktweets week 6	.582
EthNews week 6	Ktweets week 7	.672
EthNews week 7	Ktweets week 8	.596
EthNews week 8	Ktweets week 9	.586
EthNews week 11	Ktweets week 12	.578
EthNews week 13	Ktweets week 14	.745
EthNews week 14	Ktweets week 15	.603
EthNews week 16	Ktweets week 17	.595
EthNews week 17	Ktweets week 18	.634
EthNews week 24	Ktweets week 25	.607
EthNews week 25	Ktweets week 26	.634
EthNews week 28	Ktweets week 29	.652
EthNews week 33	Ktweets week 34	.584
Ktweets week 2	EthNews week 3	.584
Ktweets week 3	EthNews week 4	.678
Ktweets week 5	EthNews week 6	.707
Ktweets week 6	EthNews week 7	.836
Ktweets week 7	EthNews week 8	.707

Ktweets week 12	EthNews week 13	.693
Ktweets week 13	EthNews week 14	.588
Ktweets week 14	EthNews week 15	.726
Ktweets week 18	EthNews week 19	.614
Ktweets week 23	EthNews week 24	.595
Ktweets week 24	EthNews week 25	.600
Ktweets week 25	EthNews week 26	.627
Ktweets week 26	EthNews week 27	.628
Ktweets week 30	EthNews week 31	.669
Ktweets week 31	EthNews week 32	.584
Ktweets week 32	EthNews week 33	.580

Appendix C: Turnout Distribution by Variables (N = 3,898)

		2004 Presidential Election Vote	
		No	Yes
AsianMedia	0	912	1929
N = 3898	1	210	228
	2	135	201
	3	92	121
	4	28	42
EngMedia	0	676	898
N = 3898	1	258	433
	2	200	474
	3	175	434
	4	68	282
BothMedia	0	854	1543
N = 3898	1	261	424
	2	136	260
	3	82	198
	4	44	96
ArrvYR	1	66	8
N = 3201	2	265	169
	3	487	731
	4	256	672
	5	63	345
	6	29	110
HateCrime	0	1206	2235
N = 3852	1	146	265
Mobilization	0	1061	1319
N = 3898	1	246	721
	2	70	481
Education	1	75	69
N = 3777	2	69	100
	3	269	356
	4	163	295
	5	445	894
	6	315	727
Income	1	123	202

N = 2568	2	126	160
	3	128	173
	4	159	279
	5	114	237
	6	92	207
	7	54	118
	8	105	291
Conservative	0	108	273
N = 647	1	66	200
Liberal	0	145	282
N = 839	1	120	292
Interest	1	349	316
N = 3836	2	543	924
	3	288	676
	4	165	575
Trust	1	145	355
N = 3566	2	274	493
	3	213	383
	4	366	701
	5	218	418
InEfficacy	1	470	772
N = 3643	2	400	750
	3	146	223
	4	151	341
	5	94	296
ExEfficacy	1	142	331
N = 3512	2	274	504
	3	230	381
	4	374	755
	5	182	339
Korean	0	1256	2323
N = 3898	1	121	198
Chinese	0	1041	2163
N = 3898	1	336	358
Vietnamese	0	1233	2157
N = 3898	1	144	364
PanID	0	83	146
N = 1946	1	419	768

	2	164	366
Commonality	0	525	1008
N = 3123	1	538	1052

Appendix D: Partisanship Distribution by Variables (N = 5159)

		Partisan Attachment			
		Nonidentifier	Republican	Independent	Democrat
AsianMedia	0	1053	542	836	1222
N = 5159	1	276	99	100	152
	2	191	83	86	103
	3	111	53	58	89
	4	42	9	29	25
EngMedia	0	896	349	423	530
N = 5159	1	296	143	212	273
	2	219	133	191	324
	3	185	107	172	274
	4	77	54	111	190
BothMedia	0	1062	435	674	1047
N = 5159	1	316	144	191	251
	2	146	101	109	172
	3	104	68	88	90
	4	45	38	47	31
ArrvYR	1	205	27	84	85
N = 4282	2	258	75	168	222
	3	483	235	350	437
	4	314	222	191	312
	5	106	99	109	145
	6	36	26	27	66
HateCrime	0	1494	717	951	1402
N = 5077	1	129	62	147	175
Mobilization	0	1300	472	683	955
N = 5159	1	255	181	287	416
	2	118	133	139	220
Education	1	121	31	21	39
N = 4917	2	101	47	28	61
	3	311	140	151	217
	4	144	116	108	189
	5	553	275	373	532
	6	341	148	380	490
Income	1	160	86	67	113
N = 3235	2	130	62	73	111

	3	112	72	86	114
	4	151	94	127	181
	5	128	59	114	144
	6	81	55	98	149
	7	42	30	52	79
	8	95	78	127	165
Conservative	0	123	129	116	105
N = 786	1	45	152	57	59
Liberal	0	131	46	125	284
N = 1091	1	83	87	91	244
Interest	1	471	100	180	197
N = 5062	2	616	268	420	624
	3	362	233	281	410
	4	161	169	219	351
Trust	1	143	66	166	250
N = 4660	2	263	101	282	385
	3	291	106	155	265
	4	390	264	294	411
	5	271	200	160	197
InEfficacy	1	537	233	391	466
N = 4780	2	468	223	319	522
	3	184	91	86	140
	4	152	107	153	235
	5	98	71	129	175
ExEfficacy	1	165	64	170	192
N = 4754	2	294	129	252	348
	3	265	144	168	229
	4	398	257	301	510
	5	218	115	143	212
Korean	0	1541	688	1070	1455
N = 5159	1	132	98	39	136
Chinese	0	1281	717	809	1330
N = 5159	1	392	69	300	261
Vietnamese	0	1516	570	983	1503
N = 5159	1	157	216	126	88
PanID	0	96	36	78	97
N = 2534	1	440	241	343	528
	2	169	127	146	233

Commonality	0	636	292	475	647
N = 4079	1	525	342	458	704
Citizenship	0	586	106	242	327
N = 5159	1	1087	680	867	1264

Appendix E: 2008 NAAS Question Wording

1) Partisanship and Turnout (DVs)

QD1 Party identification screener (rotated)

656-657 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a [RANDOMIZE ORDER OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRAT] Republican, Democrat, Independent, some other party, or do you not think in these terms?

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Republican	786	15.2 %
2	Democrat	1591	30.8 %
3	Independent	1086	21.1 %
4	Other party (Specify)	23	0.4 %
5	Do not think in these terms (DO NOT READ)	1185	23.0 %
98	Don't Know	365	7.1 %
99	Refused	123	2.4 %

QC7 Did you vote in the 2004 U.S Presidential election?

578-579 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

Thinking about past elections, did you vote in the 2004 U.S Presidential election?

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Yes	2696	52.3 %
2	No	1581	30.6 %
3	Not eligible	800	15.5 %
98	Don't Know	67	1.3 %
99	Refused	15	0.3 %

2) Media use (same for radio, TV, the internet)

QB2 Do you read newspapers for information about politics?

55-56 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

People rely on different sources for political information. Do you read newspapers for information about politics?

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Yes	3473	67.3 %
2	No	1665	32.3 %
98	Don't Know	20	0.4 %
99	Refused	1	0.0 %

Based upon 5159 valid cases out of 5159 total cases.

QB2A Is that Asian-language, English-language, or both?

57-58 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

[If B2=YES] Is that Asian-language, English-language, or both?

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Asian-language	1057	20.5 %
2	English-language	1435	27.8 %
3	Both	977	18.9 %
97	Skip/NA	1686	32.7 %
98	Don't Know	4	0.1 %

3) Length of residence (arrival year, hate crime experience, mobilization)

QA6 What year did you first come to live in the United States on a permanent ba

43-46 (width: 4; decimal: 0)

numeric

[IF FOREIGN-BORN] What year did you first come to live in the United States on a permanent basis?

Value	Label	Unweighted Frequency	%
97	Skip/NA	588	11.4 %
98	Don't Know	53	1.0 %
99	Refused	236	4.6 %
1924	-	1	0.0 %
1930	-	1	0.0 %
1933	-	1	0.0 %

There is information from 1934 to 2005.

2006	-	45	0.9 %
2007	-	32	0.6 %
2008	-	21	0.4 %

QF6 Ever been a victim of a hate crime?

733-734 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

Have you ever been a victim of a hate crime? That is, have you ever had someone verbally or physically abuse you, or damage your property specifically because of your race or ethnicity?

Value	Label	Unweighted Frequency	%
1	Yes	513	9.9 %
2	No	4564	88.5 %
98	Don't Know	62	1.2 %
99	Refused	20	0.4 %

QC16 Political party or candidate contacted you about a campaign?

610-611 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

In the past 12 months, has a political party or candidate contacted you about a campaign?

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Yes	1519	29.4 %
2	No	3592	69.6 %
98	Don't Know	40	0.8 %
99	Refused	8	0.2 %

QC17 Other organization contact you about a campaign?

612-613 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

Did any other organization contact you about a campaign in the past 12 months? [IF RESPONDENT ASKS FOR CLARIFICATION] We are talking about groups like unions, community groups, and other organizations outside of political parties and campaigns.

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Yes	840	16.3 %
2	No	4256	82.5 %
98	Don't Know	59	1.1 %
99	Refused	4	0.1 %

4) SES (education and income)

QJ1 Highest level of formal education completed

771-772 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

What is the highest level of formal education you completed?

Value	Label	Unweighted Frequency	%
1	Primary or grammar school	212	4.1 %
2	Some high school	237	4.6 %
3	High school graduate	819	15.9 %
4	Some college	557	10.8 %
5	College graduate	1733	33.6 %
6	Masters (all Masters except MBA; IF MENTIONS MA, MSc, MPH...)	949	18.4 %
7	Business Degree (MBA)	61	1.2 %
8	Law Degree (JD)	16	0.3 %
9	Medical Degree (M.D., D.O.; Dentistry, Optometry)	47	0.9 %
10	Doctorate (all other Doctorates; PhD, Ed.D, Psych D)	286	5.5 %

QJ6 Pre-tax household income last year

791-792 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

Which of the following best describes the total pre-tax income earned by everyone in your household last year? [READ CATEGORIES]

Value	Label	Unweighted Frequency	%
1	Up to \$20,000	426	8.3 %
2	\$20,000 to \$35,000	376	7.3 %
3	\$35,000 to \$50,000	384	7.4 %
4	\$50,000 to \$75,000	553	10.7 %
5	\$75,000 to \$100,000	445	8.6 %
6	\$100,000 to \$125,000	383	7.4 %
7	\$125,000 to \$150,000	203	3.9 %
8	\$150,000 and over	465	9.0 %
98	Don't Know	693	13.4 %
99	Refused	1231	23.9 %

5) Political orientations (Liberal, Conservative, Interest, Internal and external Efficacy, Trust)

QG4A Strong liberal or not so strong liberal?

687-688 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

[IF G4="Liberal"] Do you think of yourself as a strong liberal or as a not so strong liberal?

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Strong liberal	505	9.8 %
2	Not so strong liberal	586	11.4 %
97	Skip/NA	4032	78.2 %
98	Don't Know	33	0.6 %
99	Refused	3	0.1 %

Same for Conservative

QB1 How interested are you in politics?

53-54 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

How interested are you in politics - very interested, interested, somewhat interested, or not at all interested?

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Not at all interested	948	18.4 %
2	Somewhat interested	1928	37.4 %
3	Interested	1286	24.9 %
4	Very interested	900	17.4 %
98	Don't Know	91	1.8 %
99	Refused	6	0.1 %

QG5_A Politics so complicated cant understand what going on

646-647 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Disagree strongly	473	9.2 %
2	Disagree somewhat	647	12.5 %
3	Neither agree nor disagree	501	9.7 %
4	Agree somewhat	1532	29.7 %
5	Agree strongly	1627	31.5 %
98	Don't Know	336	6.5 %
99	Refused	43	0.8 %

QG5_C Public officials and politicians care what people like me think

650-651 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

Public officials and politicians care what people like me think.

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Disagree strongly	591	11.5 %
2	Disagree somewhat	1023	19.8 %
3	Neither agree nor disagree	806	15.6 %
4	Agree somewhat	1466	28.4 %
5	Agree strongly	688	13.3 %
97	Skip/NA	1	0.0 %
98	Don't Know	538	10.4 %
99	Refused	46	0.9 %

QG5_B We can trust our government in Washington to do what is right

648-649 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

We can trust our government in Washington to do what is right.

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Disagree strongly	625	12.1 %
2	Disagree somewhat	1031	20.0 %
3	Neither agree nor disagree	817	15.8 %
4	Agree somewhat	1359	26.3 %
5	Agree strongly	828	16.0 %
97	Skip/NA	1	0.0 %
98	Don't Know	451	8.7 %
99	Refused	47	0.9 %

6) Demographic factors (Citizenship and Ethnicity)

QJ13 Visa, green card, or U.S. citizen?

810-811 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

[ASK IF FOREIGN-BORN FILL IN "CITIZEN" IF HIDDEN NATIVITY VARIABLE =U.S. BORN] Many people in the U.S. are not citizens. Some are on student or travel visas, or they have green cards because they are permanent residents. Are you currently on a visa, have a green card, or are you a U.S. citizen?

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Visa	147	2.8 %
2	Green card	756	14.7 %
3	U.S. Citizen	3898	75.6 %
97	Skip/NA	90	1.7 %
98	Don't Know	41	0.8 %
99	Refused	227	4.4 %

QS2 What race or ethnicity do you consider yourself?

21-22 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

What race or ethnicity do you consider yourself? [IF MORE THAN ONE RESPONSE, ENTER FIRST RESPONSE HERE, AND OTHER RESPONSES ON NEXT SCREEN. PROBE FOR RESPONSE BY READING FIRST 5 CATEGORIES IF RESPONDENT SAYS DON'T KNOW OR REFUSE; OTHERWISE DO NOT READ. IF RESPONDENT SAYS "(ETHNIC GROUP) AMERICAN" (ie "CHINESE AMERICAN") MARK ETHNIC GROUP]

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Black/African American	9	0.2 %
2	Asian or Asian American	1347	26.1 %
3	Native American/American Indian	16	0.3 %

and there are other ethnic Americans.

7) Ethnic identity

QF2 What happens to other Asians affects your life?

703-704 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

Do you think what happens generally to other Asians in this country affects what happens in your life? [MARK "MAYBE", "SOMEWHAT", "A LITTLE", "SORT OF" AS YES]

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Yes	2313	44.8 %
2	No	2341	45.4 %
98	Don't Know	457	8.9 %
99	Refused	48	0.9 %

QF3A Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?

1 A lot, 2 Some, 3 Not very much

QF7_D Do Asians share common political interests?

741-742 (width: 2; decimal: 0)

numeric

Would you say they share common political interests?

<i>Value</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Unweighted Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>
1	Yes	2029	39.3 %
2	No	2050	39.7 %

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